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At-Will Employment In Pennsylvania




At-will employment allows termination of employment by
either an employee or employer for no cause at all.' Recently, courts
and legislatures in jurisdictions outside Pennsylvania have created
certain exceptions to the at-will employment relationship.' Despite
widespread criticism, 3 however, courts in Pennsylvania4 have seem-
ingly remained faithful to the doctrine.
* B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt
University; L.L.M. (Labor), Temple University; Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pennsylvania; Mem-
ber Pennsylvania Bar.
1. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) refers to at-will employment
as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to
serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by
either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of
time or by supervening events.
id
2. See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
3. Recent commentators consider at-will employment the labor relations topic for the
1980s. See, e.g., C. BAKALY, JR. & J. FEERICK, DEVELOPING RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE
WORKPLACE (1981) [hereinafter cited as BAKALY, JR. & FEERICK]; C. BAKALY, JR. & J.
GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: FORMATION, OPERATION AND
REMEDIES FOR BREACH (1983); J. BARBASH, J. FEERICK & J. KAUFF, UNJUST DISMISSAL AND
AT WILL EMPLOYMENT (1982) [hereinafter cited as BARBASH, FEERICK & KAUFF]; R. BER-
ENBEIM, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS (1980); R. COULSON, THE TERMINATION HAND-
BOOK (1981); THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ISSUE (M. DICHTER & A. GROSS eds. 1982); F.
FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NON-UNION COMPANIES (1980); A. WESTIN,
WHISTLEBLOWINo, LOYALTY, AND DISSENT (1980); Abramson & Selvestri,
Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in Maryland, 10 BALT. L. REV. 257
(1981); Baxter, Jr. & Farrell, Constructive Discharge - When Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 346 (1981); Berger, Defning Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34
STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981); Blades, Employment At-Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Bowers & Clarke, Unfair
Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative.- A4 Study of 'Other Substantial Reason,' 10 INDUS. L.J.
34 (1981); Dedon, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The Employee At Will Relationship in
Massachusetts, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 285 (1980); DeGiuseppe, Jr., Effect of the Employment
,4t- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benets, 10 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1 (1981); Enright, The Motivation Requirement in Single Employee Discharge Cases, 11
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 501 (1980); Harrison, Wrongful Discharge.- Towarda More Efficient Remedy,
In the 1960s, vast changes were instituted at the federal' and
state6 levels to eliminate employment discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, national origin, age, and handicap. Today a corollary
interest exists in broadening protections for employee job interests.
56 INDIANA L.J. 207 (1981); Hochman, Determining a Standard of Causationfor Discriminatory
Discharges Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 913 (1981); Isaacson, The Worker's Re-emergence as an Individual, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
189 (1981); Lewis, Employment Protection.4 Preliminary Assessment ofthe Law of Unfair Dis-
missal, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 19 (1981); Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to Sue for
Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1980); Mennemier, Protection from
Unjust Discharges. An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 49 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Mennemier]; Murg & Sharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329 (1982); Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims byAt Will Employees.- A
New Legal Concernfor Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265 (1981); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Em-
ployment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Peck]; St. Antoine, The Right Not to be Fired Unjustly, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as St. Antoine]; Summers, Protecting Al Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, 58
HARV. Bus. REV. 132 (1980); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal- Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Individual Protection];
Tanis, Contract Law: Tort Law as a Basis for Wrongful Discharge 4ctions in Illinois, 12 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 861 (1981); Van Nopper, III, Workers' Compensation - Retaliatory Discharge -
The Legislative Response to Dockery v. Lampart Table Company, 58 N.C.L. REV. 629 (1980);
Vernon & Gray, Termination At Will - The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
25 (1980); Weisburst, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule.
The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981); Comment, Wrongful Discharge of
Employees Terminable At Will - A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 724 (1981); Comment, The Employment-at- Will Rule: The Development ofExceptions and
Pennsylvania's Response, 21 DUQ. L.R. 477 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Employ-
ment-at- Will Rule]; Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.. Tort Actionfor Retaliatory Discharge
Upon Filing of Workmen's Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. 659 (1979); Comment, Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation: Is the Public Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad
Omen/or the Employment RelationshivZ 33 RUTOERS L. REV. 1187 (1981); Comment, Kelsay V.
Motorola, Inc.: 4 Remedyfor the Abusively DischargedAt Will Employee, 1979 S. ILL. UNIV.
L.J. 563 (1979); Comment, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.. Wrongful Discharge, A New Tort
to Protect At Will Employees, 8 WASH. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 91 (1980); Note, Job Securityfor the
At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Dischargefor Cause, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 697 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Job Security]; Note, Limiting the Employer's Absolute Right ofDis-
charge. Can Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge, 29 KAN. L. REV. 267 (1981); Note, Non-
Statutory Causes ofActionfor an Employer's Termination ofan "At Will' Employment Relation-
shiv.- A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743 (1979); Note, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Em-
ployment - The California Cause ofAction for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAC. L.J. 69 (1980);
Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 552
(1980); Note, Employer and Employee. Employee At Will - Discharge of Employee At Will
Actionable Under Public Policy Exception, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 557 (1981); Note, A Per-
sonal Damage Remedyfor the Employee At Will: A Reappraisal of a Recent Proposal, 22 S.D.L.
REV. 431 (1977); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract]; Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will -
Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate]. In Pennsylvania, the at-will employment issue has also
been recently reviewed. See, e.g., Weiner, At Will Employees Prevail in Pennsylvania, 6 PA. L.J.
I (February 14, 1983) [hereinafter citd as Weiner]; Halbert, Pittsburgh's Employment Law Firm:
Gallo & Weiner, 6 Pa. L.J. II (February 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Halbert]; Lore, Employ-
ment At Will: A View from the Other Side, W. PA. L.J. 6 (January 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Lore]; Bosch, You're Fired! Limitations on a Pa. Employer's Right to Terminate, U. PA. L.J.
14 (January 11, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bosch]; Bannon, A Tort of Wrongful Discharge,
Geary v. U.S. Steel Revisited, III PA. L.J. I (November 10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Bannon].
4. See infra note 73.
5. See infra notes 23-33.
6. See infra note 34.
This interest is in part attributable to a slowing economy,7 high inter-
est rates,8 and excessive unemployment.9 The need to protect at-will
employees who do not possess the bargaining power equal to that of
an employer has arrived.' 0 These employees are limited in their
right to seek legal redress for their wrongful terminations.
Pennsylvania courts, however, should at this time avoid further
modification of the at-will employment relationship.1 ' Restraint
should be observed to minimize the adverse effects that any complete
abrogation might have on employment, productive efficiency, and
overburdening of the judicial process with additional cases. Time
and thought should be given now to whether abrogation of the doc-
trine should occur through "judicial erosion" or "legislative
mandate."
This article examines the extent to which the legislature, rather
than the courts, should abrogate the at-will employment relationship
within Pennsylvania. Some limits must be placed upon employers to
protect employees who lack adequate bargaining power. To accom-
plish this task, the following will be reviewed: (1) historical perspec-
tive of at-will employment; (2) erosion of at-will employment within
the United States; (3) status of at-will employment in Pennsylvania;
and (4) abolishing at-will employment in Pennsylvania through a
statutory proposal.
II. Historical Development of At-Will Employment within the
United States
A4. Traditional View of At- Will Employment
Employee and employer rights within the United States trace
their beginnings to England's Statute of Labourers.' 2 This statute
provided that a general hiring of labor for an unfixed term was pre-
sumed to be for a year and a "master" could not "put away his ser-
vant" except for "reasonable cause."' 3 After its repeal, English
courts continued to apply the statute's spirit by presuming that a
"general hiring" was intended to serve as an employment contract
7. News and Background Information, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 14 (Jan. 3, 1983).
8. News and Background Information, Ill LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 127 (Oct. 18, 1982).
9. News and Background Information, 11l LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 201 (Nov. 15, 1982).
10. Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired on an at-will basis.
Another 22% are unionized and about 15% are federal or state employees. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1979, at 427 (table 704) (union membership); id. at 392 (table 644) (total labor force); id at 313
(table 509) (government employees); see generally Peck, supra note 3, at 8-10; St. Antoine,
supra note 3, at 34.
11. See infra note 73.
12. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (1969). The Statute of Labourers was en-
acted in response to the extreme labor shortage that resulted from the Black Death in the mid-
fourteenth century.
13. Id at 425-26.
for one year." If the employment continued for longer than one
year, it could be terminated only at the end of an additional year.' 5
The American at-will employment approach has been viewed
both as a departure from, and as a part of, this English heritage.
Early American courts adopted the English approach.' 6 In the
1880s, however, American law departed from this by developing its
own version of at-will employment.
In 1877, H. G. Wood's treatise on master-servant relationships
articulated what seemingly became at-will employment in
America.'7 Although "Wood's Rule" has been persuasively chal-
lenged, 8 it has become the primary basis for at-will employment in
this country.' 9 American courts probably adopted "Wood's Rule" to
facilitate development during the industrial revolution by promoting
the prevalent economic idealogy of laissez-faire and freedom of con-
tract.2" Within this framework "Wood's Rule" seemed equitable. It
provided the employer the flexibility to control the workplace
through the unchallengeable power to terminate at will. In turn, the
employee retained the freedom to resign if more favorable employ-
ment presented itself or if working conditions became intolerable.
The at-will employment relationship has been codified in several ju-
risdictions2' and referred to by the United States Supreme Court.22
14. The English term "general hiring" is equivalent to the American term "indefinite
hiring" - an employment relationship with no specific duration. Annot., Duration o/Contract
of Hiring which Specfied No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per Day,
Week, Month, or Year, II A.L.R. 469 (1921).
15. Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (C.P. 1827).
16. P. SELZNIcK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 133 (1969). See, e.g., Adams
v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom
v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1881).
17. Wood wrote that:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him
to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a
day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (3d 3d. 1886) [hereinafter cited as H. WOOD].
18. The notion that at-will employment arrangements of indefinite duration are termina-
ble by either party at any time is not one that has its roots deep in the English common law.
See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. It apparently sprang from an American treatise
writer. See H. WOOD, supra note 17; see also Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate, supra note
3, at 205-06 nn.22-30 and accompanying text. The treatise cited three cases that supposedly
supported this view: Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80
U.S. 254 (13 Wall.) (1871); DeBriar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg.
Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870) (cited in H. WooD, supra note 17, § 136, at 283 n.5). Commentators,
however, have severely questioned the soundness of this support. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra
note 3, at 33-34; Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 3, at 485; Note, Job Security, supra
note 3, at 699-700; Note, Implied Contract, supra note 3, at 341 nn.53 & 54.
19. Annot., supra note 14, at 470; Annot., Employee's Arbitrary Dismissal as Breach of
Employment Contract Terminable At Will, 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975). See also Note, Limiting the
Right to Terminate, supra note 3, at 206 n.30.
20. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Protection, supra, note 3, at 484-86; Comment, Protect-
ing,4t Will Employees, supra note 3, at 1824-36; Note, Job Security, supra note 3, at 700; Note,
Implied Contract, supra note 3, at 342-43, 346-47.
21. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-101 (1979).
B. Statutory Restrictions on the Right to Terminate At- Will
Congress and various state legislatures have prohibited, in cer-
tain instances, the summary termination of an at-will employee.23
The primary federal statutory schemes that limit an employer's right
to terminate an at-will employee are the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA)2 4 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25
The LMRA prohibits termination for exercising the right to organize
and select an employee representative. 26 Title VII prohibits any ter-
mination based upon discrimination involving race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 7 In enforcing these statutes, courts have
maintained that an employer is free to terminate an employee for
any reason except one specifically prohibited by these statutes. 28
Other legislation restricting the right to terminate includes: (1) the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;29 (2) the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970;10 (3) the Vietnam Era Veterans
Readjustment Assistance Act;3' (4) the Fair Labor Standards Act;
32
and (5) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 33 State statutes contain simi-
lar limitations. 4
22. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908).
23. Generally speaking, United States government employees, as well as various state
and municipal employees, may not be terminated without a hearing and, in some instances,
government employees cannot be fired except upon a showing of cause. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513 (Supp. IV 1980) (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). For example, the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 provides that a government agency may remove or otherwise discipline a
covered employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the Civil Service. The
statute also provides a notice period prior to adverse action and affords the employee the right
to be represented by an attorney and the right to a written decision enumerating the reasons
for the action taken. Id
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-20002-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1942).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination based on age).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for as-
sertion of rights guaranteed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
31. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(a)(A)(i), 2021(a)(B), 2021(b)(1) (1976) (guaranteeing the right to
re-employment upon satisfactory completion of military service and prohibiting discharge
"without cause" within one year after re-employment).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) (prohibiting discharge of an employee for filing any
complaint or instituting any proceeding under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring affirmative action to advance the employ-
ment of handicapped individuals by government contractors or subcontractors).
34. See Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate, supra note 3, at 203 n.10. For example,
state legislatures have also provided some protection for at-will employees. Several states have
statutes prohibiting discharges based upon political activity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). For a collection of state laws regarding firing for political activity, see
119821 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 43,045. Some states prohibit discharges because of
physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) (West Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie Law. Co-op. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 1(2)
(West Supp. 1981). A few states do not permit employers to take action against employees for
serving as jurors or for indicating their availability as jurors, for example, Idaho, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, North Dakota, and Vermont. For a collection of state laws regarding termina-
tion for serving on a jury, see [1982] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 43,035, 54,055. Other
The principal goals of this federal and state legislation have
been to: (1) promote unionization as a countervailing force against
employer power and control;35 (2) establish a minimum level of eco-
nomic entitlement for employees;36 (3) combat discrimination
against specific groups in hiring and dismissals; 37 (4) protect em-
ployee health and safety;38 and (5) guarantee a minimum level of
security for retirement and for the survivors of wage earners.39 In
addition, the "assumption of risk doctrine" as it applied to employ-
ment has been effectively repealed by workers' compensation laws.4 °
III. Erosion of At-Will Employment
Perhaps the most significant recent legal development affecting
employment relations has been the modification of at-will employ-
ment in a number of jurisdictions.4' In the past twelve years, critics
states prohibit termination for refusing to take a lie detector test, for example, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Washington. For a collection of relevant state laws, see [19821 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State
Laws) 1 43,055. Another common provision in state laws is a prohibition against retaliatory
termination for filing a workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch. 3 (1966); Bonfield, The Substance ofAmerican Fair Employ-
ment Practices Legislation I Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 907 (1967).
35. See supra notes 24 and 26.
36. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) (minimum wage and hours); see U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS (1972) (federal-state un-
employment insurance system). See generally W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EM-
PLOYMENT RELATION 545-639 (1974).
37. See supra notes 25, 29-31, 33.
38. See supra note 30.
39. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat.
829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C., Social Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
40. See I. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.00-.20, at 33-39 (1978).
41. See Comment, The Unemployment-at- Will Rule, supra note 3; Note, Limiting the Right
to Terminate, supra note 3, at 203-04 n. 11. For example, courts in at least 18 states have
adopted a public policy exception to at-will employment. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
179 Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation, 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas. Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee
County Dept. of Lab. Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. v.
Meadows, No. 81-CA-2460-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
Henderson v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1979); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317
(1981); McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 App. Div. 2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353
(1979); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 817, 400 P.2d 72 (1965);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts in at least nine states, including the District of Columbia, have indicated that they
might adopt a public policy exception to at-will employment given the appropriate factual
setting. Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co.
v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41
Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. App.
have increasingly sought to abrogate this relationship. Courts and
some state legislatures have responded to this criticism by develop-
ing viable exemptions to at-will employment.
A. Court Action
1. Tort or 'Abuse" Theories. -The circumstances in which an
employer's right to terminate have been judicially curtailed under a
tort or "abuse" theory divide into three categories. First, courts have
been willing to permit an exception when the termination violates
established public policy, especially a "clear," statutorily declared
policy. Second, an exception has been applied when employees have
been involved in "whistle blowing"; i e., the reporting by an em-
ployee of unlawful or improper conduct. Finally, courts have found
an exception for "abusive" or "retaliatory" terminations; i.e., when
an employee refuses to accede to improper requests or demands.
(a) "Public Policy" exception. --One of the most important
limitations that some courts have placed upon the termination of at-
will employees is the public policy exception. This is usually applied
when employees were terminated for: (1) refusing to violate a crimi-
nal statute; (2) exercising a statutory right; (3) complying with a stat-
utory duty; or (4) observing the general public policy of the state.
Specific examples of employee terminations violating some form of
recognized public policy include: (1) declining to commit perjury at
the employer's behest;42 (2) refusing to participate in an illegal price-
fixing scheme;43 (3) serving on a jury;" (4) filing workers' compensa-
tion claims;45 (5) refusing to take a lie detector test in a state prohib-
1981); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Keneally v. Orgain,
606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980);
K.W.S. Mfg. v. McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562,
409 A.2d 581 (1979); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Courts in only six states have specifically rejected a public policy exception to at-will
employment. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Catania v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Goodroe v. Georgia Power
Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.W.2d 51 (1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d
874 (Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whitaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395
(Tenn. 1981).
42. Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1981); Petermann v. Teamsters
Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
43. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330
(1980); see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. App. 1981); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Some federal courts recently
have permitted employees fired for refusing to participate in illegal price-fixing schemes to
maintain a private cause of action under the federal antitrust laws. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crock-
er Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F.Supp. 776 (W.D.
Pa. 1982); but see In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
45. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428
iting its forcible administration;' s (6) performing unauthorized
catheterizations;47 (7) mislabeling packaged goods;48 (8) avoiding
payment of commissions;4 9 and (9) avoiding payment of a pension.5
Although the public policy exception has expanded the circum-
stances in which an employee may sue an employer, it is not without
limits. Generally, the employee initially must demonstrate that the
termination concerns a matter of public policy. When only private
interests are involved, courts hesitate to allow recovery. For exam-
ple, employees have had their claims denied when terminated for:
(1) questioning an employer's internal management system;
5'
(2) questioning an employer's integrity;5 2 (3) threatening to sue an
employer for an injury unrelated to employment;13 (4) taking too
much sick leave;5 4 (5) misusing the employer's Christmas funds;55
(6) seeking to examine an employer's books in the employee's status
as a shareholder;56 (7) attending night school;57 and (8) cohabitating
with one employee while having an affair with a married co-
employee.5 8
(b) "Whistleblowing".-Terminations involving reporting to
the employer or to government authorities the employer's or an em-
ployee's allegedly unlawful or improper conduct relate to the public
policy exception. These situations essentially involve instances of
either: (1) protective whistleblowing; or (2) active whistleblowing.
"Protective whistleblowing" occurs when the employee is asked to
commit a crime.59 "Active whistleblowing" involves the employee
seizing the initiative and disclosing his/her suspicions, which may or
may not be well-founded. Cases have recognized this exception for
reporting, to either government or employer authorities, conduct that
may violate law when no statute requires an employee to report.6 °
A.2d 1317 (1981); contra Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus.
Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978).
46. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1979).
47. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978).
48. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
49. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
50. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
51. Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
52. Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
53. Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. App. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (1980).
54. Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
55. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977).
56. Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
57. Scrogham v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
58. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. App. 1980).
59. See Tomery v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
60. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
(c) 'busive" or 'Retaliatory" termination. -In cases of abu-
sive or retaliatory termination, the employer tries to exploit a posi-
tion of power in the employment relationship. The employer then
retaliates against the employee for refusing to accede to its
demands.6'
2. Contract Theories
(a) Express or implied guarantees. -This exception concerns
situations in which employees have been told upon hiring that they
would be employed so long as they "did the job."62 Statements of
this nature may create indefinite term contracts. These situations
may occur through express agreement, oral or written, especially
when an employer's personnel manual provides a policy for release
of employees "for just cause only. ' 63 Personnel manuals potentially
may have a much broader application. Employers can probably
minimize liability, however, if they refrain from giving assurances or
promises, oral or written, at any time.'
(b) Good faith andfair dealing. -- Some courts have indicated
that an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists
in all contracts, including employment contracts.65 This covenant
results when the totality of the relationship firmly establishes the in-
dicia of an implied agreement that gives rise to the requirement of
good faith and fair dealing. Among the factors indicative of this
covenant are: (1) extraordinary length of service; (2) good employee
performance demonstrated by routine receipt of raises, bonuses, and
promotions; (3) employer assurances that employment would con-
tinue; (4) employer practice of not terminating except for cause
whether based on an oral or written policy; and (5) no prior warning
that the employee's position was in jeopardy.66
61. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
62. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Magnan v. Anaconda
Indus., Inc., 37 Conn. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
63. Id
64. See Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Person-
nel manuals and employee handbooks have been rejected as the basis for legally binding mod-
ifications of at-will employment in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and New York. See
Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 397 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. App. 1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779
(Kan. 1976); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980); Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Co. 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416
N.Y.S.2d 160, afd, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207 (1979); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100
Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Co. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400 (1980).
65. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
66. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
B. Legislative Action
Despite the seemingly abundant legislation at the federal and
state levels limiting the right to terminate at-will employees,67 an
outright alteration or abolition of at-will employment still remains to
be achieved. Regretfully, the existing piecemeal restrictions may ev-
idence a continued legislative acknowledgement that some vitality
remains in the at-will employment relationship.
This piecemeal approach, however, does not indicate complete
legislative failure to consider statutory regulation of at-will employ-
ment. Legislatures in Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota and Wisconsin have
reviewed this.68 Since 1980, Michigan, Puerto Rico and Wisconsin
have enacted limited statutory protection.69 This provision of only
limited protection indicates a beginning of serious legislative action
to firmly follow the path of many state judiciaries in modifying or
abolishing at-will employment. As more courts make in-roads into
this area, legislatures will experience increased pressure to create
statutory solutions that specifically define employee and employer
rights, instead of allowing fluctuating case law interpretations to sup-
ply definitions. The next ten years will witness continued debate on
this issue as inflation, unemployment, and employee desires for in-
creased job security remain of widespread concern.
IV. At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania
In a 1974 decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused
to create an outright nonstatutory cause of action for unjust or
wrongful terminations.7" The court did, however, acknowledge a
limited public policy exception to at-will employment by indicating
that "a discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action where
a clear mandate of public policy is violated."'" In 1981, the Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives, Committee on Labor Relations,
began considering House Bill No. 1742. This bill would establish a
statutory cause of action for unjust terminations.72
A. Court Action
Notwithstanding a possible restrictive public policy exception,
67. See supra notes 23-39.
68. See BARBASH, FEERICK & KAUFF, supra note 3, at 23, 65-79; BAKALY, JR. & FEER-
ICK, supra note 3, at 42. See also Comment, The Ernployment-at- Will Rule, supra note 3.
69. BARBASH, FEERICK & KAUFF, supra note 3, at 23, 65-79; MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362
(1982); P.R. LAWS. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a, 185b (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-1 to
60-4 (1982).
70. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
71. Id at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
72. Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 1742 (July 1, 1981).
Pennsylvania courts have followed the traditional view that either
party may terminate an at-will employment relationship for any rea-
son.7 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reexamined this view in
Geary v. United States Steel Corp. 74 In Geary, an at-will employee
was terminated for notifying the employer of serious defects in sev-
eral products marketed by the employer."
In affirming the case's dismissal, the court determined that the
employee bypassed the employer's chain of command and created a
nuisance. The court, however, indicated that in some circumstances
an employee could have a cause of action for wrongful termina-
tion.76 While cognizant of radical changes in the economic environ-
ment and employment relationships since the 1891 Pennsylvania
decision77 initially acknowledging the at-will employment relation-
ship, the court declined to create an overall nonstatutory cause of
action.78 Consequently, Geary has not precluded all wrongful termi-
73. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Henry v. Pitts-
burgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891); Appeal of Colban, 58 Pa. Commw.
104, 427 A.2d 313 (1981); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump - Aldrich Div., 281 Pa.
Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980); Reuter v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386
A.2d 119 (1978); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1979); Callahan
v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wood v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 536 F.
Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Boresen v. Rohm and Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Rogers v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Lekish v. Inter-
national Bus. Mach. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1979); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Arnold v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); O'Neill v. A.R.A. Services, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Wehr v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F.. Supp.
903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); but see Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co., 224 Pa. 45, 73 A. 8 (1909).
74. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); see also BANNON, supra note 3, at 1.
75. George G. Geary's duties involved the sale of tubular products to the oil and gas
industry. His employment was at-will. He claimed that his termination stemmed from a disa-
greement concerning one of the company's new products, a tubular casing designed for use
under high pressure. Geary alleged that he believed the product had not been adequately
tested and constituted a serious danger to anyone who used it. He voiced misgivings to his
superiors and was ordered to "follow directions," which he agreed to do. Nevertheless, he
continued to express reservations and took his case to a vice-president in charge of the prod-
uct's sale. As a result of his efforts, the product was re-evaluated and withdrawn from the
market. Despite these actions, which were in the best interest of the public and the company,
he was summarily terminated. 456 Pa. at 171, 319 A.2d at 174.
76. The court stated:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer has
no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of the areas by virtue of the employer's
power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where
some recognized facet of public policy is threatened. . . . We hold only that where
the complaint itself discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for terminating an at-
will employment relationship and no clear mandate of public policy is violated
thereby, an employee at-will has no right of action against his employer for wrongful
discharge.
Id. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180.
77. See supra note 73.
78. The Court indicated that:
1. Suits of this nature could impact on the legitimate interests of employers in hiring
and retaining the best personnel available and inhibit the critical judgments by
employers concerning employee qualifications.
2. Suits of this nature could impose a heavy burden upon the judicial system in
terms of an increased case load and thorny problems of proof.
456 Pa. at 181, 319 A.2d at 179.
nation actions. Several claims have been filed in state and federal
courts within Pennsylvania; these have attempted to fall within
Geary's apparent restrictive public policy exception.79 Aside from
cases grounded in traditional tort theory, an analysis reveals that the
public policy exception in Pennsylvania applies only when a clear
constitutional or statutory mandate exists.80
Any discussion of this area within Pennsylvania should not omit
Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co. It Pennsylvania courts and commen-
tators who have reviewed at-will employment have repeatedly over-
looked this decision. 2 Trainer indicates that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court,' as early as 1909, permitted recovery for a wrongful
termination based on a contractual theory.83 Trainer involved the
termination of an employee who had been hired to manage a spin-
ning company." The facts made no reference to any written em-
ployment agreement. Only corporate minutes and resolutions
referred to the employment. Termination occurred after differences
arose between the employee and some members of the corporation's
board of directors. The employee sued to recover the balance of the
salary allegedly due for the remaining period of time that the em-
ployee was not permitted to continue as a manager. A jury trial re-
sulted in a verdict that allowed the recovery. The Pennsylvania
79. See supra note 73.
80. Subsequent Pennsylvania decisions have recognized causes of action for wrongful
termination where employees have alleged retaliations for exercise of their statutory rights or
duties. For example, termination of an employee for serving on jury duty, refusing to submit
to a polygraph examination, or to participate in an allegedly illegal price-fixing scheme, vio-
lates a clear mandate of public policy. Reuter v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,
386 A.2d 119 (1978); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979);
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In fact, within Pennsylvania
there is already evidence that jury verdicts favoring employees are occurring in unreported
cases. See Weiner, supra note 3; Halbert, supra note 3.
Other cases, however, have rejected wrongful termination claims where the public policy
allegedly violated has not been defined by the legislature. For example, reporting that com-
pany money was used to finance loan-shark operations and to bribe officials. See O'Neill v.
ARA Services, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
In several cases, plaintiffs have attempted to transform allegations of age, sex, race, or
handicap discrimination into wrongful termination claims. These plaintiffs have maintained
that the public policy against discrimination is statutorily defined and that violations of this
policy should be actionable under the recognized exception to employment at-will. Federal
courts interpreting Pennsylvania law, however, have rejected these contentions, holding that
the exclusive remedy for allegations of age, race, sex, or handicap discrimination is provided
by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. (Purdons
1964, Supp. 1982-83); Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 858
(1983); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. 1977); Bruffett v. Warner Commu-
nications, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1982); but see McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F.
Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
81. 224 Pa. 45, 73 A. 8 (1909).
82. A review of Shepards Citations indicates that this case has never been overruled or
cited by any court. Its only reported recognition outside of its original publication appears in
the Annotated Law Reports. See Annot., Vacation Pay Rights of Employee Not Hired Under
Collective Labor Agreement, 91 A.L.R.2d 1079 n.4 (1963).
83. 224 Pa. 45, 48, 73 A. 8, 10 (1909).
84. Id
Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict and indicated that "the jury
could very properly. . . determine whether there was 'just cause' for
the discharge.
85
This case is significant. It supports an additional exception to
at-will employment other than a public policy exception based on an
express or implied contract.86 A "just cause" requirement may also
be a prerequisite to termination. 7 Trainer analogizes to cases in
other jurisdictions that allow recovery for a wrongful termination
and that involve express or implied contracts founded on policy
books, handbooks, personnel manuals, promissory estoppel, reliance
and change of position by the parties, oral promises, corporate min-
utes, etc.88 In fact, Pennsylvania courts have already recognized
that, for "public employees," a handbook may create an employ-
ment property right that requires a hearing prior to termination.89
Using Trainer as a basis, an employee should prevail in Penn-
sylvania if he/she can establish either all or a combination of any of
the following: (1) that the termination without "just cause"9 0 offends
the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained
in all contracts, including employment contracts, especially where
there has been a substantial length of service; raises, bonuses, and
promotions were routinely received; prior assurances were given that
employment would continue if a "good job" was performed; the em-
ployer acknowledged a practice of not terminating personnel except
for cause; or no formal criticism or warning was received that em-
ployment was in jeopardy; and (2) the employer breached its policies
mandating a responsibility to engage in good faith or fair dealing
rather than in arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory conduct with
respect to employees. 9' Therefore, in Pennsylvania, judicial excep-
tions to at-will employment should be recognized if founded on a
violation of public policy, or an express or implied contract.
B. Legislative Action - Pennsylvania House Bill 1742
Recently, within the Pennsylvania Legislature, House Bill No.
1742 was presented for consideration.92 House Bill No. 1742 pur-
85. Id at 51, 73 A. at 10.
86. See supra notes 62-66.
87. Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co., 224 Pa. 45, 51, 73 A. 8, 10 (1909).
88. See supra notes 62-66.
89. See Appeal of Colban, 58 Pa. Commw. 104, 427 A.2d 313 (1981).
90. Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co., 224 Pa. 45, 51, 73 A. 8, 10 (1909).
91. See supra notes 62-66.
92. Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 1742 (July 1, 1981). This proposed
legislation reads as follows:
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE BILL NO. 1742
INTRODUCED JULY 1, 1981
REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS
AN ACT
ports to create a general statutory scheme to protect Pennsylvania's
Protecting employees from unjust dismissal, providing for mediation and arbi-
tration proceedings and providing legal remedies.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as
follows:
Section 1. Short Title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Unjust Dismissal Act."
Section 2. Definitions.
The following words and phrases when used in this act shall have, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this section:
"Bureau." The Bureau of Mediation of the Department of Labor and Industry.
"Dismissal." An involuntary discharge from employment, including a resigna-
tion or voluntary quit resulting from an improper or unreasonable action or inaction
of the employer.
"Employee." A person who performs a service for wages or other remuneration
under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied. Employee does not
include those protected by a collective bargaining agreement or those protected by
civil service or tenure against unjust discharge, or a person who has a written employ-
ment contract of not less than two years and whose contract requires not less than six
months' notice of termination.
"Employer." A person who has one or more employees, including an agent of
an employer.
"Registered mail." Includes certified mail.
Section 3. Dismissal of employees.
(a) Grounds. - An employer may not discharge an employee except for just
cause.
(b) Notice. - An employer who discharges an employee shall notify the em-
ployee orally at the time of discharge and in writing by registered mail within 15
calendar days after the discharge, of all reasons for the discharge.
Section 4. Complaints of unjust dismissal.
(a) Time for filing. - An employee who believes that he or she has been dis-
charged in violation of section 3(a) may file by registered mail a written complaint
with the Bureau of Mediation, not later than 30 days after receipt of the employer's
written notification of discharge as provided in section 3(b).
(b) Time when notice requirement not met. - If an employer fails to provide the
discharged employee with written notification of his or her discharge and the reason
for same, the discharged employee may file by registered mail a written complaint, as
described above, with the Bureau not later than 45 calendar days after the discharge.
Section 5. Mediation.
(a) Appointment of mediator. - Upon receipt of a complaint from a discharged
employee, the Bureau shall appoint a mediator to assist the employer and the dis-
charged employee in attempting to resolve the dispute.
(b) Explanation of arbitration option. - If the dispute is not resolved within 30
calendar days after the commencement of mediation, the mediator shall explain to
the employer and employee, the process and purpose of final and binding arbitration.
Section 6. Arbitration proceedings.
(a) Request for arbitration. - After the option of arbitration is made available
to the discharged employee, the employee may request a continuance of mediation if
he or she believes that a mutual resolution of the dispute is possible. If a mutual
resolution is not likely, the discharged employee may file by registered mail a written
request with the Bureau for arbitration of the dispute.
(b) Hearing. - Within 60 calendar days after his or her appointment, or within
further additional periods to which the parties may agree, the arbitrator shall call a
final hearing and shall give reasonable notice of the time and place of the hearing to
the employer and the employee.
Section 7. Decision of arbitrator.
(a) Time of decision. - Within 30 calendar days after the close of the hearing,
or within further additional periods to which the parties may agree, the arbitrator
based upon the issues presented to him or her, shall render a signed opinion and
award. The arbitrator shall deliver by registered mail a copy of the opinion and
award to the employer, the employee and the Bureau.
(b) Remedies. - The remedies from which the arbitrator may select include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(i) Sustaining the discharge.
(2) Reinstating the employee with no, partial or full back pay.
(3) A severance payment.
employees from wrongful terminations.93 Excluded from coverage
are any employees protected by a collective bargaining agreement,
those protected by civil service, tenured employees, or persons who
have a written employment contract of not less than two years and
whose contracts require not less than six months notice of
termination.
94
The bill would require employers to terminate employees only
for "just cause." 95 If terminated,.the employee must receive oral no-
tification at the time of termination, and written notification by reg-
istered mail within fifteen calendar days of the termination, of all
reasons for the action.
House Bill No. 1742 permits employees to file complaints con-
cerning their terminations.96 Written complaints must be fied with
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation within thirty days of the ter-
mination. Once the complaint is received, the Bureau must appoint
a mediator to assist the employer and the terminated employee in
resolving the dispute. If, within thirty calendar days after com-
mencement of mediation, no mutually satisfactory resolution has oc-
curred, the employee has the option of invoking arbitration
proceedings.
After a hearing, the arbitrator may select remedies that include:
(1) sustaining the termination; (2) reinstating the employee with no,
(c) Settlement. - If the employer and the employee settle their dispute during
the course of the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator, upon their request, may set
forth the terms of the settlement in the award.
Section 8. Effect of award.
An award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the employer and the
employee and may be enforced, at the instance of either the employer or the em-
ployee, in the court of common pleas for the county in which the dispute arose or in
which the employee resides.
Section 9. Judicial review.
The court of common pleas for the county in which the dispute arose or in which
the employee resides may review an award of the arbitrator, but only for the reason
that the arbitrator was without or exceeded his jurisdiction, or the award was pro-
cured by fraud, collusion or other similar and unlawful means. The pendency of a
proceeding for review shall not stay automatically the award of the arbitrator.
Section 10. Contempt
Any employer or employee willfully disobeying a lawful order of enforcement
issued by the court, may be held in contempt. The punishment for each day that said
contempt shall be a fine not to exceed $250 per day.
Section !1. Construction of act.
This act shall not supersede an employer's grievance procedure that provides for
impartial and final and binding arbitration of discharge-related grievances. Upon
the request of an employer or employee, the Bureau shall determine whether or not
an employer's grievance procedure meets this standard.
Section 12. Posting copy of act.
An employer shall post a copy of this act in a prominent place in the work area.
Section 13. Effective date.
This act shall take effect immediately.
93. For a discussion of this bill see BOSCH, supra note 3, at 14.
94. Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. 1742 (July 1, 1981).
95. Id.
96. Id
partial, or full backpay; or (3) ordering a severance payment. 97 The
arbitrator's decision is appealable to the court of common pleas for
the county where the dispute arose or where the employee resides.
Judicial review of the award would be limited. The award could be
set aside only if the arbitrator exceeded his/her jurisdiction, or if the
decision was procured by fraud, collusion, or other similar and un-
lawful means.98
It is likely that House Bill No. 1742 will not be enacted as origi-
nally proprosed, if at all; however, the bill provides an excellent ref-
erence point for all interested parties to begin the debate on
abrogating at-will employment through legislative action. As em-
ployees become increasingly concerned over the importance and se-
curity of their jobs, they will in greater numbers demand that some
form of legislative action be taken to preserve their jobs, especially in
times of inflation and high unemployment.
V. Abolishing At-Will Employment Through Legislation
An employer enjoys formidable power over its employees, and
when that employer is a large corporation the power has virtually no
limit. "Take-it-or-leave-it" is the name of the game.99 Recruiters, to
attract the most qualified employees, commonly state that the em-
ployee will enjoy life-long employment if he/she performs well.
Similarly, a conscientious employer attempting to further positive
employee relations may include in an employee handbook a griev-
ance procedure or a statement that termination will be for only "just
cause." Likewise, a personnel manager, in making an employment
offer, may quote a salary on a per annum basis. These typical em-
ployer actions have for years constituted the norm. It was rarely
considered that such commonplace statements, representations, and
policy enunciations might form the basis for employer liability.
Today, there is a growing recognition that the at-will employee
should receive protection similar to most public employees and
union-organized employees in the private and public sectors. The
dissent by Justice Roberts in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. takes
on special significance as a definitive statement of these employees'
rights.' °° Justice Roberts called upon the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to take the first step and protect at-will employees from arbi-
trary and retaliatory terminations.' 0 ' Undeniably, this right goes
back to the medieval Statute of Labourers that imparted a "just
97. Id
98. Id.
99. See LORE, supra note 3, at 6.
100. 456 Pa. 171, 194, 319 A.2d 174, 185 (1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
cause" requirement in employee terminations.10 2
Job terminations are treated quite differently in other areas of
the industrial world. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
recommended in 1963 that there should be a "valid reason for such
termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker
based on the operational requirements [of the employer]."''0 3 This
recommendation was considered again at the ILO International La-
bor Conference in the summer of 1982.114 The convention called for
better protection for at-will employees. Regretfully, the American
government and its business delegates adhered to their traditional
"tunnel vision" approach on this question and voted against thc pro-
posal. 105 Significantly, all the Common Market countries, Sweden,
Norway, Japan, and Canada, afford statutory protection against
wrongful employment terminations.1°6
The practice in Western Europe is to hear wrongful termination
claims before specialized labor courts or industrial tribunals. Typi-
cally these are tripartite. These panels normally consist of a profes-
sional judge, or legally trained individual, serving as chairman along
with laypersons. 17
That all employees are entitled to protection against wrongful
terminations should be taken as a given. 08 The question involves
whether the courts or the legislatures should be the primary movers
in abrogating at-will employment. Through the courts a body of
common law would result. Statutory solutions would involve selec-
tion of tribunals and procedures. Both would be confronted with the
problem of selecting remedies. While courts may be unwilling "to
break through their self-created crust of legal doctrine,"'0 9 legisla-
tion is often the product of organized interest groups." 0
Recent judicial decisions limiting at-will employment make it
possible to foresee what the judiciary will impose."' Courts are
likely to be long on generalization and short on detail when the situ-
102. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
103. Employer Discipline: I.L.O. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 446, 449 (1964).
104. News and Background Information, 110 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 179 (July 5, 1982).
105. Id The vote was 356 in favor, 9 against, and 54 abstentions. The three United States
delegates were joined in voting against the proposal by delegates from Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, Brazil, and Chile. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government, employer,
and labor representatives all voted for the proposal. Id.
106. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee Report of the Committee
on Labor and Employment Law, At- Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36
RECORD ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK No. 4, § IIIC (April, 1981).
107. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 3, at 35.
108. This view has most recently been prominently advanced by the distinguished profes-
sor from the University of Michigan, Theodore J. St. Antoine. See ST. ANTOINE, supra note 3,
at 35; News and Background Information, 107 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 911 (June 1, 1981).
109. SUMMERS, Individual Protection, supra note 3, at 521.
110. PECK, supra note 3.
1I. See supra notes 41-66, 70-71, 73-91, 100-101.
ation requires outlining procedures and remedies. 12 Even though
legislatures may not wish to take the initiative for understandable
political reasons, they may be compelled to take action by the bold-
ness of some courts. 13 At some point, employers may support legis-
lation in the belief that the compromises and greater exactness of a
statutory solution are preferable to the broad strokes and blurred
outlines often produced by an uninnovative judiciary. 114 Even more
important, nonunionized employers may perceive legislation as the
most important deterrent to unionization of their plants because the
union's argument of increased job protection from wrongful termi-
nation is minimized."15
The result may be that in a number of states the process of abro-
gating at-will employment will require two stages. The courts may
take the first step, which may be considered as tentative. After this,
the legislatures may find themselves compelled to provide a more
definitive, logical, and orderly framework for resolution of these
disputes.' 16
Pennsylvania should not follow this two-stage process. Courts
are neither equipped to handle the additional caseload nor suffi-
ciently experienced in the area of employee terminations. The long
and procedurally cumbersome judicial process cannot provide ade-
quate or swift remedies to the parties involved."l7 Adequate consid-
eration of employers' and employees' interests in at-will employment
relationships demands new, specialized legislation. The judiciary
may appropriately respond to the extreme case or to the atypical sit-
uation; however, courts have no capacity to construct an administra-
tive mechanism for daily enforcement and the average person has no
ready access to their more formalized processes.
Any statute should take the initial handling of these matters out
of the court's jurisdiction. Instead, arbitrators should handle all em-
ployee termination disputes. These arbitrators should receive the
same court deference as arbitrators in other labor matters receive., 18
112. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 3, at 35.
113. Id
114. This promise of a union bargaining greater job security cannot be underestimated. It
is one of the most important reasons why employees seek to organize. On the other hand,
organizational labor may be a critical factor in securing legislative relief. It is the only interest
group that might be willing to take the lead in promoting such a cause. A common assump-
tion, however, is that unions will not favor legislation protecting employees against arbitrary
treatment by employers because it will undercut one of the unions' prime selling points. This
possibility cannot be denied. Organized labor, however, could profit considerably from refur-
bishing its image as the champion of the disadvantaged. More practically, a universal rule
against termination without cause could actually prove beneficial to unions in their organizing




118. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Arbitration would provide a proven, quick, inexpensive, and final
resolution without overburdening the courts." 9
The statute should articulate a standard for lawful termination
or discipline in terms similar to "just cause."' 120  Certain employees
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The grievance arbitration process has been described
as being:
at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the
means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the
problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will gen-
erally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of the
disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and
content is given to the collective bargaining agreement. . . . The grievance proce-
dure is, in other words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining process.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
119. See MENNEMEIER, supra note 3.
120. Most collective bargaining agreements in the private and public sectors do, in fact,
require "cause" or "just cause" for termination or other discipline. Where this is not contained
in a collective bargaining agreement many arbitrators imply a "just cause" limitation. For
instance, Arbitrator Walter E. Boles held that "a just cause" basis for consideration of discipli-
nary action is, absent or clear proviso to the contrary, implied in a modem collective bargain-
ing agreement. See Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 301 (1955). The
reason is:
If the Company can discharge without cause, it can lay off without cause. It can
recall, transfer, or promote in violation of the seniority provisions simply in invoking
its claimed right to discharge. Thus, to interpret the Agreement in accord with the
claim of the Company would reduce to a nullity the fundamental provision of a
labor-management agreement - the security of a worker in his job.
See Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747, 749 (1949).
The general significance of the terms "cause" or "just cause" were discussed by Arbitrator
Joseph D. McGoldrick as follows:
. . "[lit is common to include the right to suspend and discharge for "just cause,"
"justifiable cause," "proper cause," "obvious cause," or quite commonly simply for
"cause." There is no significant difference between these various phrases. These ex-
clude discharge for things for which employees have traditionally been fired. They
include the traditional causes of dischaige in the particular trade or industry, the
practices which develop in the day-to-day relations of management and labor and
most recently they include the decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a
growing body of "common law" that may be regarded either as the latest develop-
ment of the law of "master and servant" or, perhaps, more properly as part of a new
body of common law of "Management and labor under collective bargaining agree-
ments." They constitute the duties owed by employees to management and, in their
correlative aspect, are part of the rights of management. They include such duties as
honesty, punctuality, sobriety, or, conversely, the right to dischage for theft, repeated
absence or lateness, destruction of company property, brawling and the like. Where
they are not expressed in posted rules, they may very well be implied, provided they
are applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner.
Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955).
Absent precise definitions, "cause" or "just cause" may be considered any combination of
the following factors:
(a) The "law of the shop" as to the particular offense; ie., the response to that offense
developed over a period of years. Showing a consistent pattern of viewing that offense in a
certain manner, as requiring severe or less than severe discipline;
(b) A consistent pattern of enforcement of rules and regulations and of making known the
rules to all employees;
(c) Case histories of other incidents of enforcement;
(d) Known practices of severe discipline for certain offenses because of the product manu-
factured or safety consideration;
(e) Offenses calling for immediate suspension and those not requiring removal;
(f) On-premises and off-premises offenses, and the differences in their treatment;
(g) General "arbitral authority," derived from publication of awards, articles, etc.;
(h) The arbitrator's own sense of equity and his/her subjective judgment as to the signifi-
should be excluded from the statute. Among those appropriately ex-
cluded are probationary employees and employees covered by a con-
tract or collective bargaining agreement providing for binding
arbitration in the event of a termination.
Instead of opposing legislation, the prudent employer should
welcome a statutory scheme as providing an orderly legal remedy
outside the courtroom. The alternative involves the prospect of in-
creased and costly litigation. Terminated employees can be expected
to litigate new fact situations concerning an employer's obligation to
deal with employees fairly and in good faith.
Preventive employer planning can be important. More respon-
sible employee hiring, training, and termination procedures should
be developed. In essence, abrogation of at-will employment may
cause employers to make better employment decisions that may
eventually effect improved personnel policies. These policies should
result in more efficient use of personnel, if the employer conscien-
tiously develops these areas.
At the same time, any legislation should create responsibilities
for both employees and employers in terminations. Employers
should be afforded protection for improper employee resignations
that include usurping corporate opportunities to work for a competi-
tor or to compete against the employer.' 2' These general guidelines
provide the framework for legislation that will not undermine the
employment relationship. The legislation sets forth a speedy, just,
inexpensive, and conclusive means for resolving one of the most im-
portant disputes between employee and employer.
VI. Statutory Proposal for Regulating At-Will Employment in
Pennsylvania
A. Statutory Proposal
Outlined below is a statutory proposal for regulating at-will em-
ployment terminations within Pennsylvania:
EMPLOYEE/EMPLOYER PROCEDURES FOR
EFFECTING TERMINATION OF THE
cance, seriousness and weight to be given the incident involved, the record of the employee, or
the circumstances causing the termination;
(i) The severity of the case's facts;
(0) Attempts made to rehabilitate the employee by the employer;
(k) Progressive discipline steps that may or may not have been taken;
(1) The discipline penalty imposed as it relates to the case's facts;
(in) Whether a "second chance" is warranted from the employee's prior record; or
(n) Whether the employee is unreclaimable as indicated by his/her prior record, facts of
the case; etc.
For a general discussion of "cause" and "just cause" see F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKs 611-13 (3d ed. 1976).
121. See Annot., Liabilityfor Inducing Employee Not Engagedfor Definite Term to Move to
Competitor, 24 A.L.R.3d 821 (1969).
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Section 1. Short Title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Act Regu-
lating Employment Terminations."
Section 2. Definitions.
The following words and phrases when used in this act shall
have, unless clearly indicated otherwise, the meanings given to
them in this section:
"Appointing Authority." Either the Pennsylvania Bu-
reau of Mediation or the Court of Common Pleas, whichever
is designated the responsibility through the filing of a com-
plaint for appointing an arbitrator to hear an employment
termination.
"Bureau." The Bureau of Mediation of the Department
of Labor and Industry.
"Court of Common Pleas." The Court of Common
Pleas for the county where the termination of employment
occurred.
"Employee." Any person who performs a service for
wages or other remuneration under a contract of hire that is
written, oral, express, or implied. Employee includes any
person employed by an individual, person, partnership, asso-
ciation, corporation, and the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, including any of its political subdivisions or any
agency, authority, board, or commission created by them.
Employee does not include those: (a) covered by a collective
bargaining a~reement that contains a final and binding griev-
ance arbitration procedure for the review of employment ter-
minations; (b) protected by a statutory civil service or tenure
procedure; (c) who has a written employment agreement that
contains a final and binding grievance arbitration procedure
for the review of employment terminations; or (d) that is in a
probationary status.
"Employer." Any individual, person, partnership, asso-
ciation, corporation, and the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, including any of its political subdivisions or any
agency, authority, board, or commission created by them.
"Person." Any individual, sole proprietorship, partner-
ship, association, corporation, and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, including any of its political subdivisions or
any agency, authority, board, or commission created by them.
"Probationary Status." A six month period of time that
occurs immediately after an employee is hired by an em-
ployer. It shall not include the situation in which an already
employed employee is given a new employment position, ad-
vancement, or promotion by his/her employer.
"Termination of Employment." Any involuntary or vol-
untary discontinuation of the employment relationship by an
employee or employer including but not limited to: termina-
tions, discharges, resignations, firings, layoffs that result from
an improper action or inaction of an employee or employer,
etc.
Section 3. Termination of Employment.
Termination of the employment relationship by an employee
or employer shall not occur unless there is a valid reason for the
termination that is not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory and
relates to: (a) the ability or conduct of the employee; (b) the oper-
ational requirements of the employer; or (c) an employee's desire
to seek other employment or discontinue current employment.
Section 4. Termination of Employment - Notice
(a) Employee Initiated Terminations. An employee who ter-
minates the employment relationship on his/her own initiative
shall notify the employer orally of the intended termination at
least fifteen (15) calendar days prior to the effective date of termi-
nation and shall before the date of termination provide the em-
ployer in writing with the reasons for the discharge either through
delivery in person or by certified mail return receipt requested.
(b) Employer Initiated Terminations. An employer who ter-
minates the employment relationship shall notify the employee
orally at the time of the employment termination of the reasons
therefore and thereafter in writing by delivery in person or by cer-
tified mail return receipt requested within ten (10) calendar days
after the employment termination of all the reasons therefor.
Section 5. Termination of Employment - Complaints.
An employee or employer who believes that a termination of
employment has occurred in violation of section 3 may file by cer-
tified mail return receipt requested a written request for arbitra-
tion of the dispute with either, but not both, the: (a) Bureau of
Mediation; or (b) the Court of Common Pleas for the county
where the termination of employment occurred at the county's
Prothonotary's office. This written request must be mailed by cer-
tified mail return receipt requested not later than thirty (30) days
after receipt of the employee's or the employer's written notifica-
tion as is provided for in Section 4. Where no written notification
or an untimely written notification is provided in accordance with
Section 4, the employee or employer must file this written request
by certified mail return receipt requested not later than ninety (90)
days after the employee's last date of employment.
Section 6. Arbitration.
(a) Appointment. Where a written request for arbitration has
been fied with the Bureau of Mediation, the Bureau shall appoint
an arbitrator within forty-five (45) days after the request is re-
ceived from the panel of arbitrators maintained by the Bureau and
shall within this time period notify the employee and employer of
the appointment. In the event a written request for arbitration is
filed with the Court of Common Pleas for the county where the
termination of employment occurred, the Court on its own motion
shall appoint an arbitrator within forty-five (45) days after the re-
quest is received by the county's Prothonotary's Office from a list
of attorneys it shall maintain who it deems by experience, knowl-
edge, and familiarity of employment relations are qualified to
hear these disputes on an alternating basis.
(b) Hearing. Within thirty (30) calendar days after his/her
appointment, or within further additional periods of time as the
employee and employer may in writing agree, the arbitrator shall
schedule a hearing.
(c) Conduct of Hearing. The hearing shall be conducted in
the following manner:
(1) Fixing of Locale - The parties may mutually agree
upon the locale where the arbitration is to be held. If there is
a dispute as to the appropriate locale, the arbitrator shall
have the power to determine the locale and his/her decision
shall be binding. At least ten (10) days prior to the hearing,
the arbitrator shall mail notice of the time and place of the
hearing, unless the parties otherwise agree.
(2) Vacancies - If any arbitrator should resign, die,
withdraw, refuse, or be unable or disqualified to perform the
duties of his/her office, the Bureau or the Court of Common
Pleas, whichever was the original appointing authority, shall,
on proof satisfactory to it, declare a vacancy. Vacancies shall
be filled in the same manner as the making of the original
appointment, and the matter shall be reheard by the new
arbitrator.
(3) Representation of a Party - Any party may be repre-
sented at the hearing by an attorney or by another representa-
tive of their choosing.
(4) Stenographic Record - Any party may request a
stenographic record by making their own arrangements. If a
transcript is agreed by the parties to be the official record of
the proceeding, it must be made available to the arbitrator.
The cost of a record shall be paid by those parties requesting
one in such proportion as they may agree.
(5) Attendance at Hearing - Persons having a direct in-
terest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. The
arbitrator shall have the power to require the retirement of
any witness or witnesses during the testimony of other wit-
nesses. It shall be discretionary with the arbitrator to deter-
mine the propriety of the attendance of any other persons.
(6) Adournments - The arbitrator for good cause shown
may adjourn the hearing upon the request of a party or upon
his/her own initiative, and shall adjourn when all the parties
agree thereto.
(7) Oaths - Before proceeding with the testimony, the
arbitrator may, in his/her discretion, require witnesses to tes-
tify under oath administered by him/her or if requested by
either party.
(8) Arbitration in the Absence of a Party - The arbitra-
tion may proceed in the absence of any party, who, after due
notice acceptable to the arbitrator, fails to be present or fails
to obtain an adjournment.
(9) Evidence - The parties may offer evidence as they
desire and shall produce additional evidence as the arbitrator
may deem necessary to an understanding and determination
of the dispute. The arbitrator may subpoena witnesses and
documents upon his/her own initiative or upon the request of
any party. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy
and materiality of the evidence offered and conformity to le-
gal rules of evidence shall not be necessary. All evidence
shall be taken in the presence of the arbitrator and all of the
parties, except where any of the parties is absent, in default,
or has waived his/her right to be present.
(10) Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of Documents -
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of wit-
nesses by affidavit, but shall give it only such weight as
he/she deems proper after consideration of any objections
made to its admission.
(11) Inspection - Whenever the arbitrator deems it nec-
essary, he/she may make an inspection in connection with the
subject matter of the dispute.
(12) Closing of Hearings - The arbitrator shall inquire
of all parties whether they have any further proofs to offer or
witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative replies, the
arbitrator shall declare the hearings closed. If briefs or other
documents are to be filed, the hearings shall be declared
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for filing of
these briefs. The time limit within which the arbitrator is re-
quired to make his/her decision shall commence to run, in
the absence of other agreement by the parties, upon the clos-
ing of hearings.
(13) Reopening of Hearings - The hearings may be re-
opened by the arbitrator on his/her own motion, or on the
motion of either party, for good cause shown, at any time
before the decision is made.
(14) Time of Decision - The decision shall be rendered
promptly by the arbitrator and, unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, not later than thirty (30) days from the date of
closing the hearings.
(15) Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings -
The arbitrator shall, upon the written request of a party, fur-
nish to the party at its expense certified facsimilies of any ex-
hibits in the arbitrator's possession that may be required in
judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration. Personal
notes and working papers of the arbitrator are exempt from
disclosure.
(16) Judicial Proceedings - The arbitrator is not a neces-
sary party in any subsequent judicial proceedings relating to
the arbitration unless a court so requires.
(d) Decision. After the close of the hearing, the arbitrator,
based upon the issues presented, shall render a written opinion
outlining the reasons for the decision. The arbitrator shall sign
and date the decision. A copy of the decision shall be mailed to
the employee, employer, and the appointing authority by certified
mail return receipt requested. Parties shall accept as legal delivery
the date the decision is received in the mail via certified mail re-
turn receipt requested from the arbitrator, addressed to such party
at its last known address or to its attorney, or other representative
appearing at the hearing.
(e) Remedies. The remedies from which the arbitrator may
select include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Sustaining the termination of employment against the
employee or employer with or without a monetary award.
(2) Reinstating the employee with no partial, or full back
pay.
(3) A severance payment.
(4) Adding a reasonable rate of interest to any monetary
award.
(5) Requiring restitution for any employee or employer
property.
(6) Attorney's fees or other fees for a party's
representative.
(7) Any other remedy permitted under the law.
(f) Settlement. At any time after the appointment of the arbi-
trator, the employee and employer may settle their dispute and the
terms of the settlement shall be set forth in an arbitrator's
decision.
(g) Costs of Arbitration. The employee and employer shall
share equally the costs of the arbitration, but shall bear their own
costs for witnesses and the presenting of their respective position
unless otherwise decided by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall set
his/her own fee for the hearing of the dispute.
Section 7 Effect of the Arbitrator's Decision.
An arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding upon the
employee and employer and may be enforced in the Court of
Common Pleas for the county in which the dispute arose.
Section 8. Judicial Review.
The Court of Common Pleas for the county in which the dis-
pute arose shall review the arbitrator's decision, upon petition by
either an employee or employer filed within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the arbitrator's decision. This review shall be only for
the reasons that:
(a) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as
a neutral or corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudicing
the rights of any party;
(b) the arbitrator exceeded his/her powers; or
(c) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon good
cause being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material
to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing so as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
The pendency of a proceeding for review by the Court of
Common Pleas or any further appeal to either the Superior Court
in appeals involving private sector employees or the Common-
wealth Court in appeals involving public sector employees, or in
subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shall
not automatically stay enforcement of the arbitrator's decision.
Section 9. Contempt.
An employee or employer who disobeys a lawful order for
enforcement of an arbitrator's award issued by any court of this
Commonwealth, may be held in contempt. The punishment for
each day that the contempt occurs shall be a fine as set by the
court, imprisonment, or any other enforcement measure deemed
appropriate.
Section 10. Conflict With Other Acts.
Initiation of procedures pursuant to this act, shall preclude an
employee or employer from instituting similar proceedings under
any other act. The remedies and procedures of this act shall be
exclusive and shall not be construed to duplicate any other act or
be in addition thereto.
Section 11. Notice of this Act.
(a) Posting ofAct. An employer shall post a copy of this act
in a prominent place of the work area.
(b) Copy ofAct to Employee. Where the employer terminates
the employment relationship, a copy of this act shall be provided
along with the written notification provided for in section 4(b).
Section 12." Effective Date.
This act shall take effect 90 days after enactment and shall
cover any termination of employment that occurs on or after the
effective date of this act. This act shall not be retroactive.
B. Analysis of Statutory Proposal
In comparison to statutory schemes for the regulation of at-will
employment that have been suggested within Pennsylvania' 22 and
other jurisdictions, 23 this proposal is unique. Its scope is much
broader than a mere attempt to abrogate at-will employment. The
proposal offers an all-encompassing attempt to set forth procedures
for terminating the employment relationship by both employees and
employers. Efforts to regulate this area must consider and balance
both employee and employer rights. Employees must be protected
from improper employment terminations initiated by employers and
employers should be accorded equal recourse against improper em-
ployment terminations.
The proposal is intended to cover all employees and employers
in the public and private sectors. Only limited exclusions are pro-
vided for: (1) employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment that contains a final and binding grievance arbitration
procedure for the review of employment terminations; (2) employees
protected by a statutory civil service or tenure procedure; (3) em-
ployees employed pursuant to a written employment agreement that
contains a final and binding grievance arbitration procedure for the
review of employment terminations; or (4) employees classified in a
probationary status.
The standard to evaluate an improper termination by either an
employee or employer is simple. The issue is whether a valid reason
exists for the termination, which reason is not arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory. This standard is broad yet specific in that a "valid
reason" for the termination must exist.
Notice of an employment termination is required of both em-
ployees and employers. This notice must be given both orally and in
writing. A cause of action for an improper termination occurs from
122. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
the date the written notice is received by certified mail return receipt
requested. When no notice is given or timely received, the period for
filing a complaint is increased. This extension is provided to en-
courage the giving of written notice; otherwise, potential backpay li-
ability is extended.
The initiation of the complaint simply requires the filing of a
request for arbitration. The complainant may select one of two
choices. The initiation may occur through the services of the Bureau
of Mediation of the Department of Labor and Industry or through
the local Court of Common Pleas for the county in which the im-
proper employment termination occurred.
The proposal places no additional burden on the Bureau of Me-
diation to administer this act. The Bureau already has available lists
of arbitrators that it considers competent to handle these disputes.
The only duty of the Bureau is to appoint an arbitrator. An em-
ployee and employer are given no discretion in the selection of the
arbitrator. The selection is solely the responsibility of the Bureau of
Mediation.
The act places an additional, yet not overburdensome, require-
ment on the Court of Common Pleas. The court must develop a list
of attorneys that it feels can serve competently as arbitrators.
24
These individuals should have the experience, knowledge, and fa-
miliarity necessary to deal with employment relations. 25 This re-
quirement is an effort to develop a pool of individuals who may be
called upon later to serve as labor arbitrators for other disputes.
The at-will arbitration is conducted like any other labor arbitra-
tion. An arbitrator's award is final and binding on the parties, and
can only be set aside through the same standards that apply to the
review of any arbitration award. Failure to conform to an arbitra-
tion award carries a severe contempt penalty.
To discourage appeals of other than the most legitimate cases,
no automatic stay of enforcement is provided. This lends further to
124. Within Pennsylvania, court appointed arbitrators are already used to hear and decide
civil cases. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7361 (Purdon's 1982). A similar pool of arbitrators
may provide the training ground for what could eventually become a labor court. See infra
note 125.
125. An even bolder approach would be to establish a separate system of labor courts
within Pennsylvania to deal with any labor-related problem. This suggestion has been previ-
ously advanced by other commentators for use within the United States. See Jones & Smith,
Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with
Comments, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1115, 1122 and n.l I(1964). A system of specialized labor courts
has been successful in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. These courts could be operated with
a simplified procedure like that used in small claims courts. In this way, cases could be readily
presented by personnel managers, union representatives, or other laypersons without the ne-
cessity of being represented by attorneys. In simple cases, the use of attorneys may only obfus-
cate and complicate what is readily apparent. These courts would also be equipped to hear
complex cases to give full scope to representation by legal counsel. See P. HAYES, LABOR
ARBITRATION - A DISSENTING VIEW 116-18 (1966).
the finality and binding quality of any arbitrator's decision. To re-
ceive the benefit of a stay, a party must demonstrate some likelihood
of success on appeal or extreme prejudice.
This procedure is not intended to duplicate any other remedies
available for improper employment terminations. All employees
must receive notice of the act. Finally, the effective date of the act is
postponed for ninety days to allow employees and employers to pre-
pare for the act's implementation.
This proposal is an effort to provide a quick, efficient, and eco-
nomical means for resolving employment termination disputes be-
tween employees and employers without unduly placing an extra
strain on the courts of this Commonwealth. Undeniably, as this area
of the law continues to develop during the next ten years, legislatures
will be increasingly called upon to regulate this area by both em-
ployees and employers. The proposal is intended as a beginning
point for immediately addressing the needs of both employees and
employers in the termination of any employment relationship.
VII. Personnel Policies to Avoid At-Will Employment Litigation
No employer desires engaging in litigation if it can be avoided.
This is particularly true of suits brought by former employees charg-
ing wrongful termination. Even when an employer prevails, it may
suffer damage from poor publicity. Because courts and legislatures
are altering at-will employment, many employers may be left unpre-
pared. Termination practices once acceptable may suddenly become
inadequate.
Lawsuits, whether justified or not, generate poor public rela-
tions for employers. Consequently, many employers settle out of
court to avoid negative publicity. Realizing this, more and more at-
tonieys are ready to pursue at-will employment cases on a contin-
gency basis because the likelihood of monetary settlement has
increased.
It is only human nature for an employee to classify a termina-
tion as unjust. Whether the terminations are just or unjust, however,
they often cause deep-seated emotional problems. Thus, the desire
to sue for damages is not surprising. In view of the growing evidence
of judicial and legislative sympathy for terminated employees, litiga-
tion will surely increase during the 1980s.
Despite this, employers can lessen their exposure to involve-
ment in these cases. The following suggestions may aid in minimiz-
ing any employer liability:
1. Put the grounds for termination in writing and distribute this
information to all employees. This may protect against charges of
termination without proper warning.
2. Document every termination action. Keep precise records of
conferences, warnings, probationary notices, remedial efforts, and
other steps that precede termination.
3. Refine performance evaluations to give honest appraisals of
each employee's weak and strong points. The courts are particularly
sympathetic to documented evidence that a terminated employee
had previously received favorable annual assessments.
4. Provide advance warning that an employee has taken a
course possibly leading to termination unless changes occur in
his/her performance. Put these notices in writing or have witnesses
present at oral admonitions.
5. Watch for signs of an employee's work problems. Job-re-
lated stress or discontent over working conditions may turn a once
satisfactory performer into a termination possibility. Signs include a
drop in productivity, a tendency to slow down on the job, and an
increase in the number of complaints. Try to reclaim such an em-
ployee before termination becomes necessary.
6. Involve two or more persons in the termination process. This
practice can minimize suits that allege malice or personality conflicts
between a terminated employee and a supervisor.
7. Review severance pay policies. If a terminated employee
considers a severance payment fair, he/she may be less likely to ini-
tiate litigation. Any extra money expended usually amounts to only
a fraction of what a court might award.
8. Develop a severance package that includes continuance, for a
limited time, of health and life insurance benefits. Such courtesies
may preclude any charges of vindictiveness and may help to mollify
any injured feelings.
9. Terminate only when you must, and terminate only with care
and compassion. In general, an exit interview should be conducted
away from other employees to avoid embarrassment. The reason(s)
for termination should be explained clearly and the nature of any
reference to be given should be described.
10. Consider buying "defense and judgment" insurance. This
relatively new form of coverage protects employers against lawsuits
arising from cases other than personal-injury or property-damage
suits covered under conventional insurance policies.
An employer should be able to document that a termination was
for "cause" to prevent lawsuits, contest unemployment compensa-
tion claims, defend union challenges, or successfully litigate discrim-
ination charges. In addition to keeping written records, an employer
should follow clear-cut, well-publicized procedures for all discipli-
nary actions.
Proper attention to an employee's problem or the employer's
problems with him/her may save the employee's position and save
the employer future trouble and expense. If the cause of an em-
ployee's problem is personal, counseling may provide the answer; if
the problem is vocational, either transfer or retraining may help. It
pays to postpone a termination until all other possibilities have been
examined. If termination is unavoidable, however, the employer
should proceed slowly and carefully; everyone will benefit in the
end.
VIII. Conclusion
The foregoing examination of the at-will employment doctrine
and its abrogation through legislative means has not purported to
offer the only, or necessarily the preferable, method of dealing with
this increasingly important question. However, it is believed that
statutory regulation realistically offers the most concrete manner in
which to confront this problem. The need for immediate and
thoughtful study in this area is clear. Until the impact or viability of
regulating employment terminations through statute is assessed,
courts will continue to develop a common law that encourages over-
burdening the judicial system by failing to set forth specific guide-
lines. This will be costly for employees, employers, and an already
overtaxed judicial system.
The time is now for all interested parties to begin a thoughtful
and realistic examination of this developing area. No longer can
employers ignore the impact of these disputes. Courts of this and
other jurisdictions have already set forth sufficient warning signals
for the initiation of legislative action.
